The evolution of U.S. earnings inequality: 1961?2002 by Zvi Eckstein & Éva Nagypál
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review
Vol. 28, No. 2, December 2004, pp. 10–29
The Evolution of U.S. Earnings Inequality:
1961–2002
Zvi Eckstein  Éva Nagypál
Tel Aviv University   Northwestern University
Abstract
The goal of this article is to summarize the main trends in the earnings and 
employment distribution in the United States using data drawn from the March 
Current Population Surveys covering the period between 1961 and 2002. We 
show that inequality started to increase for men in 1974, and for women in 
1981, and for both genders inequality continued to increase throughout 2002. 
During the same period the wage premium of college graduates over non-
college workers increased substantially and the ratio of college educated workers 
to non-college workers also increased. These facts support the popular skill-
biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis. However, other facts raise some 
doubts about the SBTC hypothesis. First, the college wage premium is mainly 
due to workers with a postgraduate degree, but their increase in the labor force 
started much earlier than the spectacular rise in their wages. Also there has been 
no marked change in recent decades in the occupational distribution of work-
ers. However, the earning premium of professional over blue collar workers 
followed the same trend as the college earning premium. And ﬁ  nally, the most 
dramatic changes in the labor market took place among women. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
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This article summarizes the main trends in the earnings 
and employment distribution in the United States during 
the last four decades, using data drawn from the March 
Current Population Surveys (March CPS) covering the 
period between 1961 and 2002, with an emphasis on the 
evolution of earnings inequality. The rising overall earn-
ings inequality has been accompanied by a large increase 
in earnings dispersion both among and within groups 
(deﬁned by characteristics such as education or experi-
ence). A large and growing body of research, reviewed 
in Katz and Autor 1999, documents the increase in wage 
dispersion that took place between the mid ’70s and the 
mid ’90s. These facts have motivated much research 
aimed at revealing the underlying economic process 
generating the increase in earnings inequality. 
Our aim in this article is twofold. First, we will revisit 
the empirical evidence on the trends in earnings inequal-
ity. We document that overall earnings inequality con-
tinued to increase sharply all through 2002, especially 
among men. Second, and more importantly, we will look 
at a more broad set of facts than what is usually studied 
in the earnings inequality literature.
After documenting the rise in overall earnings in-
equality, we follow the literature and document the rise 
in the wage premium of college graduates and the 
concurrent increase in the proportion of workers that 
graduated from college. These two facts have led many 
researchers to claim that the only way to explain the two 
trends is by a large increase in the demand for skilled 
workers relative to that for less-skilled individuals due 
to skill-biased technical change (SBTC). The com-
puter revolution that started in the early ’80s, and its 
spectacular growth over the last two decades, provides 
an appealing reason to accept the SBTC hypothesis 
as the explanation for the rise in earnings inequality 
and the widening earnings gap between college and 
non-college educated workers.1 See Aghion 2002, 
Acemoglu 2003, and Krusell et al. 2000 for recent 
related literature.
We show that, once more facts are brought to bear 
on the SBTC hypothesis, it is unclear whether that hy- 
pothesis provides a sufﬁcient explanation for the de-
velopment of earnings inequality over the last four 
  * All the data and programs used to generate the reported results, and additional 
ﬁgures—some of which are discussed in the text but not included in the article—can 
be found at http://faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/nagypal/QRproject/.
  The authors would like to thank Ellen McGrattan, Yona Rubinstein, Art Rolnick, 
and Gianluca Violante for their comments. They also thank Marina Agranova for 
outstanding research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal 
Reserve System.
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decades. It is an open question whether the skill level 
of workers should be measured by their schooling level 
or by their occupation. Casual observation on the way 
labor markets operate would indicate that employers 
post their vacancies and employees apply for jobs by 
specifying ﬁrst the occupation and only second the level 
of education. [We show that the only marked change in 
recent decades in the occupational distribution has been 
the increase in the share of professional women.] The 
earnings premium of professional workers over blue 
collar workers rose at almost the same rate and during 
the same time period as the earnings premium of work-
ers with a college degree. It is unclear how the SBTC 
hypothesis can explain these trends.
We emphasize that the most dramatic changes in the 
labor market during the past four decades took place 
among women. (See McGrattan and Rogerson 2004 on 
hours worked in the U.S. labor market.) The wage gap 
between men and women declined as women’s educa-
tional attainment grew, and their workforce participation 
increased dramatically.  Women made up a signiﬁcantly 
smaller share of the workforce, yet accounted for 55 
percent of the increase in the number of workers with at 
least some college education. Despite this fact, women 
experienced less of an increase in inequality than men 
did, and, in fact, it was in the most educated groups that 
women succeeded least in closing the wage gap. The 
SBTC hypothesis needs to address these differences 
among the genders to provide a sufﬁcient explanation 
of the evolution of earnings inequality.
Since wage and employment decisions are deter-
mined simultaneously by forward-looking optimizing 
workers and employers, we look at facts, year by year, 
not only on the earnings distribution, but also on the 
employment distribution. Our aim is to state the facts 
in a simple descriptive way, which then enables readers 
to formulate their own judgment on how well existing 
theories explain the recent trends and what other expla-
nations might be important contenders.
Following the literature we restrict our sample to 
individuals between the ages of 22 and 65. We focus 
on weekly gross wage and salary earnings of full-time 
full-year employees (those working at least 40 weeks 
and 35 hours per week) between the ages of 22 and 65. 
Formally, this gives us a measure of weekly earnings, 
but since we focus on full-time full-year workers, the 
variation in hours worked per week is limited, so our 
measure is also a fairly good measure of wages. There-
fore, at times we refer to our measure as wages. We also 
look at employment of this same age group, as reported 
by the March CPS. Appendix A describes our data source 
and our sample selection choices further.
The main aggregate facts on the trend in inequality 
are discussed in the next section, where we show that 
inequality started to increase for men in 1974 and for 
women in 1981, and for both genders inequality con-
tinued to increase throughout 2002. This is a robust fact 
regardless of what speciﬁc statistic is used to measure 
inequality. In the following section we lay out the main 
facts on earnings and employment by education. During 
the same period that earnings inequality increased, the 
wage premium of college graduates over non-college 
workers increased substantially, and the premium of 
postgraduate workers increased even more. The ratio of 
college educated workers to non-college workers also 
increased from 1961 to 2002, implying that the two main 
facts that motivate the SBTC are also borne out in our 
study. We add two observations to the literature: ﬁrst, 
the most important group contributing to the increase in 
the college wage premium is workers with a postgradu-
ate degree; and second, the increase in the proportion 
of postgraduate workers in the labor force started much 
earlier than the spectacular rise in their wages. The share 
of these workers has stabilized since the early ’90s, espe-
cially among men, while their wage premium continued 
to increase.
The SBTC hypothesis posits an increase in the de-
mand for skilled labor. Are there in fact more profes-
sional workers today among the working population than 
there were 20 to 30 years ago? In the section entitled 
“Occupations: Has There Been a Skill Bias?” we show 
that after some increase in the ’70s, the employment 
share of the different occupations for men have stayed 
roughly constant from 1983 to 2001, with no signiﬁcant 
increase in the share of professional workers (30 percent 
to 33 percent). The occupational composition changed 
much more markedly for women, with the share of 
professional workers showing a secular increase from 
8 percent in 1970 to 28 percent in 2001. At the same 
time, the wage premium of professional workers over 
blue collar workers continuously rose during the same 
period that inequality increased.2 
In the next to last section on regressions, we discuss 
the trends in the estimated coefﬁcients of a standard 
  2See Appendixes A and B for the exact description of our division of the sample 
by education and occupation as well as for a description of other important aspects 
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Mincerian earnings function. The coefﬁcients on school-
ing have been rising since the early ’80s, and, hence, 
rising inequality should be attributed at least partly to 
the increase in the returns to education. We ﬁnd that the 
return to (potential) experience is notably higher for 
men than for women all through the period of study. In 
addition, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients on the professional 
and white-collar occupational dummies are substantial 
and are much higher for women than for men. Moreover, 
the coefﬁcient on the professional occupation indicator 
is comparable both in magnitude and in time trend to the 
coefﬁcient on the college graduate indicator, implying 
that occupation is indeed as important an indicator of 
skill as education. Finally, the evolution of the stan-
dard deviation of log wages and that of the standard 
deviation of the conditional error term from the OLS 
regression have exactly the same shape. This means that 
the increase in the dispersion of the residual from the 
Mincerian earnings function is a dominant factor in the 
rise in overall inequality.3 
In the ﬁnal section we provide data on labor supply. 
Despite the very different trends in male and female 
participation rates, unemployment rates show similar 
ﬂuctuations for both genders, implying that men and 
women of the same education compete in the same 
labor market. It is clear that over the last 40 years there 
has been a dramatic change in the composition of the 
labor force not only by education, but also by gender. 
While the SBTC hypothesis can potentially explain the 
changing educational composition of the labor force, 
it is less clear to what extent the change in the gender 
composition can be related to that hypothesis.4 
Earnings: Growth and Inequality
In this section we provide a summary of the trends 
in average earnings and earnings inequality for U.S. 
workers from 1961 to 2002. To achieve our goal of a 
simple summary of trends, we had to choose a method 
for presenting the facts to minimize the impact of our 
choice of moments on interpretation and, at the same 
time, keep the description simple. Since our focus is on 
changes over time, we express and graph all variables 
as an index, where the value of the index is set to 100 in 
1961, the ﬁrst year of CPS data available to us.5 This way 
we can clearly point out the timing of the main changes 
in the trends in the data.6 
Wage and salary earnings are the main component of 
labor income, but non-wage compensation has become 
a non-negligible fraction of labor income in recent de-
cades. The cross-section data on income from the CPS 
include only wage and salary earnings, and we use 
them here following the literature. It should be noted, 
however, that total compensation is the measure that we 
would ideally like to describe, since total compensation 
is what measures a worker’s return to working.7 To get 
a sense of the size of the bias introduced by using CPS 
earnings measures and not total compensation, we com-
pare the trends in compensation and those in wage and 
salary accruals per full-time employee using national 
income data (NIPA) to the trends of mean and median 
earnings per full-time employee from the CPS. This 
comparison is also useful in closing the gap between 
data normally used in macro analysis and those used in 
micro analysis.
Figure 1 makes three points: ﬁrst, it compares the 
trend in earnings to the trend in total compensation; sec-
ond, it compares the NIPA and CPS data on earnings; and 
third, it shows the trend in overall inequality by compar-
ing the trend of mean and median earnings. First, notice 
in Figure 1 that the period of lower earnings growth 
(1973–96) is also the period when compensation was 
growing faster than earnings. In other words, while the 
share of non-wage compensation (beneﬁts) was about 
8 percent to 10 percent during the ’60s, it rose rapidly to 
almost 17 percent by 1980, then peaked at 19 percent in 
1994, after which it declined to 15.7 percent by 2001.
Second, notice that the trend of mean earnings in 
the CPS closely corresponds to the trend of wage and 
salary accruals per full-time employee in the NIPA for 
the entire period of study.8 Average earnings from the 
  3Katz and Autor (1999) replicate the ﬁndings of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) 
that the error term in the Mincerian function accounts for about one-half of the rise 
in earnings inequality and that the inequality in this term rises from 1963 to today. 
Lemieux (2004) disputes the extent of the rise in the residual inequality.
  4Lee and Wolpin (2004) provide an empirical model that attempts to link the 
SBTC hypothesis to the observed changes in labor supply.
  5Since we have consistent data available on educational attainment starting in 
1963 and on occupation starting in 1970, when we include these variables we set 
the value of the indexes equal to 100 in these years.
  6Gottschalk (1997) and Katz and Autor (1999), like many other authors, use 
graphs that measure the percentage change in values at the same percentile between 
two periods (for example, 1963 to 1995) to measure the change in inequality. These 
are restrictive moments that are less informative than the graphs we show here.
  7It should be emphasized that there is no data set that continuously collects 
cross-section data on labor income that includes all sources of employee compensa-
tion and individual characteristics in a way equivalent to the data available in the 
CPS.
  8Their level differs by about 8.5 percent in the ’60s and about 13.5 percent from 
the ’70s onward, reﬂecting the fact that the full-time full-year workers of prime age 
in the CPS sample earn higher wages than the average worker in the NIPA sample 
that includes part-time workers, and young and old workers. We use our sample of 
workers at ages 22 to 65 to show that even this sample is not that different from the 
relevant NIPA data used in macroeconomic studies.Evolution of Earnings Inequality
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two sources and the wage and non-wage components 
of compensation have about the same high growth rate 
between 1961 and 1973. From 1974 onward, for about 
20 years, earnings from both sources exhibit much 
lower growth rates, although, as pointed out above, the 
growth in compensation does not slow down as much 
as the growth in earnings. From 1996 to 2002 growth in 
compensation and in earnings returns to the same level 
as it was in the ’60s.
The ﬁnal point of Figure 1, and the main focus of this 
article, is the increase in the inequality in the earnings of 
workers. Starting in the late ’60s, mean earnings began 
to diverge from median earnings, but it is clear from 
Figure 1 that the rate of divergence sped up in 1974, 
and from that point onward mean earnings grew faster 
than median earnings.9 Mean earnings were 8.5 percent 
above median earnings in 1961, 9.8 percent in 1968, 18.6 
percent in 1980, 19.8 percent in 1990, and 32.6 percent 
by 2002. The fact that the period of increasing inequality 
implied by the divergence of mean and median earnings 
coincides with the period during which total compensa-
tion grew faster than earnings implies that the two trends 
may be related.
To understand the extent to which trends in earnings 
inequality allow us to draw conclusions about trends 
in compensation inequality, note that the relationship 
between compensation and earnings inequality depends 
on two factors: whether beneﬁts are given to employees 
as ﬁxed amounts (for example, health insurance) or as 
a proportion of earnings (for example, retirement con-
tributions), and how the incidence of beneﬁts varies 
across the earnings distribution. Pierce (1999), using 
the Employment Cost Index micro data, ﬁnds that most 
beneﬁts are proportional to earnings and that workers at 
the upper end of the compensation distribution receive 
a larger share of their labor income as beneﬁts, implying 
that in the cross-section earnings inequality understates 
compensation inequality.10 
To summarize, Figure 1 shows that the last quarter 
of the twentieth century was a period of continuously 
growing earnings inequality and that this period coin-
cided with an increase in the share of employee beneﬁts 
in compensation. Furthermore, the NIPA and CPS 
earnings data are consistent and, given what we know 
about the incidence of non-wage compensation, the 
trend in inequality that we observe in the CPS earnings 
is probably a lower bound for the trend in compensa-
tion inequality.
An important characteristic of the data is the differ-
ence in trends by gender, and, thus, throughout the ar-
ticle, we separate our data by gender.11 Figure 2 shows 
the trends in mean and median real wages for each 
gender from 1961 to 2002. Over the 41-year period, male 
wages increased by 75 percent while female wages more 
than doubled at an increase of 107 percent. Most of the 
differential wage growth took place between 1978 and 
1994 when, over a decade and a half, mean wages of men 
grew a mere 4 percent while those of women increased 
by 27 percent. The catching up from the late ’70s to the 
  9Since earning distributions are approximated fairly well by a log normal dis-
tribution, the change in the distance between the mean and the median is a good 
measure of the change in inequality.
  10There is very little work comparing wage inequality with compensation in-
equality due to the lack of comprehensive compensation data.
  11It is our view, however, that the practice of separating data between the genders or, 
worse yet, focusing almost solely on male earnings, has hindered past research on wage   
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early ’90s was a period of reducing inequality between 
men and women, since women have earned less than 
men throughout our period of study. (In 2002 women 
earned only 69 percent as much as men, $36,831 com-
pared to $53,661 using annualized 2002 values.)
From 1961 to 1973 mean and median wages of men 
and women increased substantially and their trends 
moved closely together. Starting in 1974 wage growth 
slowed down while the difference between the mean 
and the median started to grow. Faster wage growth 
resumed for women in 1981, and female wages have in-
creased uniformly ever since, while male wages started 
to show a noticeable increase only since the early ’90s. 
The divergence between the mean and the median of 
both male and female wages continued throughout the 
’90s until 2002.12 In 1974 the mean wage of men was 
about 10 percent higher than the median (5 percent for 
women), while in 2002 this difference increased to 34 
percent for men (and 23 percent for women). Note that 
the real median wage for men slightly decreased from 
1974 to 1998.
From Figure 2 we conclude that from 1978 to 1994 
the earning trends of men and women caused a decrease 
in inequality between the sexes. Male earnings inequal-
ity, measured by the mean-to-median ratio, has been 
increasing from 1974 to 2002, and female earnings 
inequality has been increasing from 1981 to 2002. The 
fact that female wages started to converge to male wages 
at the same time that inequality within gender groups 
increased implies that there could be a link between 
these two phenomena.13 
In Figures 1 and 2 we measure changes in inequality 
  12Card and DiNardo (2002) ﬁnd smaller increases in inequality in the CPS in 
recent years (using two fewer years of data) and attribute any increase in inequal-
ity in the ’90s to changes in data collection methods, which we ﬁnd an insufﬁcient 
explanation.
  13Several authors fail to note this aspect of the data, as they focus exclusively 
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by comparing the trends of mean and median wages. 
Obviously, there are many other moments than the 
mean-to-median ratio that can be used to describe in-
equality, such as the 90th-to-10th percentile ratio, the 
standard deviation of log wages, the Gini coefﬁcient, or 
the coefﬁcient of variation (standard deviation of wages 
divided by the mean of wages).
Figure 3 shows the standard deviation of log wages 
for men and women from 1961 to 2002 as a measure of 
inequality, and it shows the same trends in inequality 
that we noted from Figures 1 and 2.14 Between 1961 and 
1975 inequality was roughly constant for men and was 
declining for women, the latter trend mostly due to the 
decline of female employment in some low-paid jobs 
(such as private household services). Between 1976 and 
1981 inequality started to grow for men while it stayed 
constant for women, while after 1981 it was growing 
steadily for both genders, but at a lower level for women. 
Given the initial fall in inequality for women, even with 
the subsequent rise, the level of inequality for women 
in 2002 is just 5 percent higher than it was in 1961. For 
men, the overall rise in inequality is much more marked 
with the level being 34 percent higher in 2002 than in 
1961.
To get a more detailed picture of the trend in the 
earnings distribution by gender, we graph the trend of 
earnings at the 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 10th percen-
tiles. Figure 4 shows that the trend of male earnings by 
percentile started to fan out in the mid ’70s, exactly at 
the same time as our other measures of inequality in 
Figures 1 through 3 started to increase. Real wages at 
all percentiles increased through 1973, after which the 
lower 25th and 10th percentiles declined together until 
1995, dropping to the same level as 1965, and even in 
2002 they are only back to the level of 1968. The median 
remained roughly the same between 1974 and 1995, 
with some increase in the years since then. Workers in 
the 75th and 90th percentiles made considerable gains 
between 1974 and 1995, which increased even further 
in recent years. The year 1995 marked the reversal of 
the decline of real wages at lower percentiles. After 
this date all percentiles experienced increases, though 
the increases at the upper half of the distribution were 
still more substantial than those in the lower half of the 
distribution. In particular, from 1996 to 2002, wages at 
the 90th percentile increased dramatically.
  14Sample selection choices have a signiﬁcant impact on the measure of standard 
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  Figure 5 (on which, for expositional clarity, 1981 is 
the year in which all indexes are set to 100) shows that 
the decrease in inequality for women in the ’60s was 
mostly due to the fast growth of real wages at the low-
est 10 percentiles. The increase in inequality for women 
started later than for men, around 1981, and the overall 
distribution did not fan out as much as it did for men.
In sum, Figures 4 and 5 conﬁrm that the increase in 
earnings inequality is a robust fact of the last quarter 
of the twentieth century. The increase started for men 
around 1974 and for women around 1981.
Finally, there have been some differences across 
the evolution of earnings by ethnic groups. The most 
notable one has been the decline in the relative wages 
of Hispanic men, whose wages increased at a rate 20 
percent below those of their white counterparts be-
tween 1980 and 2002, which led to an increase of the 
Hispanic/white wage gap from 26 percent in 1970 to 
41 percent in 2002. During the same period, the black/
white wage gap among men declined slightly from 
37 percent to 33 percent, while the gap between other 
ethnic groups and whites declined from 15 percent to 
6 percent. For women, the ethnic wage gaps have been 
generally smaller (in fact, other ethnic groups had a 5 
percent higher mean wage than white women), and the 
changes between 1970 and 2002 have also been smaller. 
The female black/white wage gap remained the same at 
17 percent between 1970 and 2002 (with some decline 
during the ’70s and subsequent rise in the ’80s), while 
the Hispanic/white wage gap widened from 16 percent 
to 30 percent during the same time.
Education: The Case for 
Skill-Biased Technical Change
In this section we discuss the main facts that establish 
the close link between the increase in overall earnings in-
equality and the increase in the wage premium of college 
graduates over non–college graduate workers. Figures 6 
and 7 show the trends in mean wages for men and women 
by education group from 1963 to 2002, setting the in-
dexes equal to 100 in 1963. We divide observations into 
ﬁve education categories: high school dropouts (HSD), 
high school graduates (HSG), workers with some college 
(SC), college graduates (CG), and postgraduate (master’s 
or above) degree holders (PG).15 
Figures 6 and 7 show that, within each gender, from 
1963 to 1981 wages of all education groups had almost 
identical trends, with the exception of postgraduate men. 
The year 1974 is the year that inequality for men among 
the education groups started to increase, and it is also 
the year that postgraduate earnings for men started to 
increase more than the earnings of all other schooling 
groups. Both trends continued throughout 2002. From 
1981 to the present, we observe a divergence of earn-
ings by education group for both genders, with more- 
educated groups gaining on less-educated ones.
Figures 6 and 7 clearly indicate that the ratio of the 
earnings of college educated workers (college graduate 
and postgraduate) to those of non–college graduate 
workers (deﬁned as including groups HSD, HSG and 
SC) increased substantially. This observation is central 
to the argument that SBTC is the main cause for the 
observed rise in inequality. (See, for example, Acemoglu 
2003). Note, however, that the increase in the earnings 
of postgraduate workers dominates this observation. For 
example, the ratio of earnings of postgraduate (college 
graduate) to high school graduate men was 1.4 (1.3) 
in 1963, 1.8 (1.4) in 1981, and 2.6 (1.8) in 2002, when 
postgraduate male workers were earning more than 
(U.S.) $100,000 per year on average. 
There are two notable differences between men and 
women. First, the greater increase in overall earnings of 
women shows up clearly for most education groups, just 
as it does in Figure 2. Second, the increase in inequal-
ity across education groups after 1981 is not as marked 
for women as it is for men. This is due to the fact that 
lower-educated women did better in terms of catching 
up to their male counterparts then did higher-educated 
women over this period. In fact, college graduate and 
postgraduate women saw their relative wages compared 
to men decrease between 1963 and the late ’70s. The col-
lege graduate female-to-male wage ratio dropped from 60 
percent in 1963 to 54 percent in 1978, after which point 
it started to increase and rose to 68 percent by 2002. The 
postgraduate female-to-male wage ratio dropped from 68 
percent in 1963 to 55 percent in 1978, rising to 61 percent 
by 2002, which was still lower than what it was in 1963. 
Between 1963 and 1974 the HSD, HSG, and SC groups 
saw no signiﬁcant change in their female-to-male wage 
ratio, while from 1974 to 2002, the HSD female-to-male 
wage ratio grew from 55 percent to 73 percent, the HSG 
ratio grew from 55 percent to 71 percent, and the SC ratio 
  15Note that previous studies do not generally distinguish between the college 
graduate and the postgraduate groups, which is an important innovation of our study, 
especially given the substantial differences between the two groups we document 
below. See Appendix A for a comparison of ﬁndings using four versus ﬁve education 
groups, and on how we deal with the change in the way educational attainment is 
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grew from 57 percent to 69 percent.
The deterioration of the female postgraduate wage 
position compared to the male position is not because 
postgraduate women did poorly in absolute terms. On 
the contrary, they have seen the largest wage increases 
of all education groups among women over the past four 
decades. However, postgraduate men’s wages increased 
spectacularly from 1963 to 2002, by almost 123 percent 
over this 40-year period, almost twice as much as the 
increase in the wages of male college graduates. The 
postgraduate increase for women has been less striking; 
hence, the female-to-male wage ratio within this group 
deteriorated.16 
Not only was there a signiﬁcant difference in the 
trends of earnings by schooling during the period of 
study, but there also has been an increase in the school-
ing attainment of entering cohorts, which generated large 
changes in the educational composition of the working 
population. This composition is shown in Figures 8 and 
9. From 1964 to 1995 we observe substantial changes in 
the educational composition for both men and women, 
with a slowdown in the rate of change starting in the 
second half of the ’90s. The share of high school drop-
outs went from 45 percent of men in 1964 to 12 percent 
in 2003 (and from 39 percent of women in 1964 to 8 
percent in 2003). For both men and women the high 
school graduate group increased ﬁrst and then declined 
to around 30 percent by 2003, while the some-college 
group continuously increased and reached 27 percent 
for men and 31 percent for women. Finally, the share 
of postgraduates was less than 4 percent among men 
and 2 percent among women in 1964 and reached 10 
percent for both employed men and women by 2003. It is 
interesting to note that the trends in the educational dis-
tribution of the working population of men and women 
are similar and that the male and female educational 
distributions seem to reach some stability and similar-
ity by the end of the millennium, with the distribution 
of workers being 12 percent HSD, 30 percent HSG, 26 
percent SC, 21 percent CG, and 11 percent PG among 
men, and 8 percent HSD, 29 percent HSG, 31 percent 
SC, 22 percent CG, and 10 percent PG among women.
  16When comparing means to medians within groups deﬁned by gender and 
education, we see that means grow faster than medians, indicating that there has 
been an increase in inequality within all groups. Based on the mean-to-median 
ratio, the increase in within-group inequality has been more substantial for higher 
education groups and for men. When we examine ﬁgures for the ﬁve percentiles 
(90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 10th) within each schooling level for men, we ﬁnd that 
for all schooling levels there has been an increased diversity that started around 
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Figures 6–9 provide the main evidence that motivates 
the SBTC hypothesis. That is, the earnings of workers 
with a college degree relative to the earnings of non- 
college workers grew during the same period as overall 
inequality increased. At the same time, the share of col-
lege degree male (female) workers in the labor market 
increased from about 13 percent (11 percent) in 1964 
to about 32 percent (32 percent) in 2003. This observa-
tion led to the view that the main cause of the rise in 
inequality is due to changes in labor demand resulting 
from skill-biased technical change.17 
Occupations: Has There Been a Skill Bias?
The division of workers by occupation has not been a 
standard practice of economists who emphasize com-
petition and mobility in the labor market. Search theory 
introduces frictions into the labor market, while the 
theory of speciﬁc human capital introduces mobility 
costs. Thereby, both restrict mobility and, hence, point 
to the importance of the division of the labor market by 
occupation.18 
We divide workers into three occupation groups: 
professionals including managers (PRO), white collar 
(WC), and blue collar (BC). Professionals include physi-
cians, lawyers, scientists, engineers, computer specialist, 
college professors, and managers in corporations and 
smaller ﬁrms. White collar workers are teachers, sales 
workers, tellers, technicians, and the like, and blue 
collar workers are service workers, laborers, machine 
operators, and such.19 See Appendix B for a list of 
which detailed occupations belong to our three occupa-
tion groups. In Figure 10 we provide the employment 
shares of the various occupations from 1970 onward 
for men and women. The share of male professionals 
grew somewhat until 1983 from 24 percent in 1970 to 
30 percent in 1983, with the blue collar group making up 
for most of the decline within the other two groups. It is 
striking to see that, despite the change in the educational 
composition and in wage inequality that took place 
at the same time, the employment shares among men 
of various occupations have stayed roughly constant 
from 1983 to 2001. (The share of professional workers 
increased slightly from 30 percent to 33 percent, with 
the share of the other two groups each declining 1.5 
percentage points.)
The occupational composition changed much more 
markedly for women, with the share of professionals 
showing a secular increase from 8 percent in 1970 to 28 
percent in 2001, which was compensated by a roughly 
  17Note, however, that most of the increase in the share of college graduates was 
prior to the period of growth in earnings inequality, and during the recent period 
of rise in earnings of PG workers (1996–2002), we do not observe the increase in 
their share in the labor market.
  18The question regarding the importance of the division of the labor market 
by education or by occupation or by both is an open one that deserves more atten-
tion.
  19Due to repeated changes in occupational classiﬁcation in the CPS, any study 
using occupation data has to attempt to make the classiﬁcations consistent over 
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10 percentage point decline in both the white collar and 
the blue collar group. In 2001 about 50 percent of men 
are BC, 17 percent are WC, and 33 percent are PRO. 
Among women 23 percent are BC, 48 percent are WC, 
and 28 percent are PRO.
Looking at the occupational composition of workers 
within schooling groups reveals that while the correla-
tion between education and occupation is strong, it is far 
from perfect. The lowest three education groups among 
men are dominated by blue collar workers (their share 
being 89 percent among HSD, 74 percent among HSG, 
and 52 percent among SC workers in 2001), while the 
top two education groups are dominated by professional 
workers (the share of which is 58 percent among CG and 
72 percent among PG workers). Moreover, there have 
been important trends in the last three decades lead-
ing to an increased correlation between education and 
occupation among men. The share of blue collar men 
increased among the lower education groups, which was 
compensated for by declines in the share of white collar 
and professional men with the former being somewhat 
larger. (The share within the HSD, HSG, and SC groups 
increased by 4, 10, and 17 percentage points, respec-
tively.) The share of white collar men declined among 
the college graduate and postgraduate groups (by 9 and 
6 percentage points, respectively), which was compen-
sated for by an increase in the share of blue collar men 
(perhaps surprisingly) among college graduates and an 
increase in professional men among postgraduates.
The trends within female occupation groups have 
been quite different. While there is, of course, a strong 
correlation between education and occupation among 
women, too, most education groups among women are 
dominated by white collar workers (except for HSD 
women, among whom blue collar workers are the larg-
est group at 71 percent in 2001). White collar workers 
make up 45 percent of the HSG group, 55 percent of the 
SC group, and 52 percent of the CG group. Even among 
postgraduate women, the largest group is that of white 
collar workers at 50 percent. The dominance of white 
collar occupations holds despite the fact that the share 
of professional women increased in all schooling groups 
between 1970 and 2001, by 5, 11, 15, 27, and 18 percent-
age points in the HSD, HSG, SC, CG, and PG groups, re-
spectively. These trends were mostly compensated for by 
the decline in the share of white collar women by 3, 19, 
19, 30, and 19 percentage points, respectively, with the 
remainder being explained by changes in the proportion 
of blue collar women. It is worth noting that the share 
of professionals among women is still quite a bit lower 
in the college graduate and postgraduate groups than 
among their male counterparts, who are still 50 percent 
more likely than women to have a professional occupa-
tion. This might go a long way toward explaining why 
postgraduate women have experienced a less spectacular 
rise in their relative wages than postgraduate men.
Figure 11 shows that the trends of mean earnings 
by occupation for men have very similar features to 
the trends by education in Figure 6. More speciﬁcally, 
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a similar rate until 1981, at which time inequality across 
occupation groups started to increase. Professional men 
gained 16 percent on blue collar men and 7 percent on 
white collar men during the ’80s. In the ’90s, they gained 
an additional 15 percent on blue collar men, while the 
wage growth of white collar men kept up with that of 
professional men and even exceeded it slightly (by 2 
percent). Overall, the gain of professional men on blue 
collar men has been very similar to the gain of college 
graduate men on high school graduate men from 1981 
to 2001 (34 percent compared to 35 percent). 
Figure 12, the equivalent graph for women (where 
the index is set to 100 in 1981 to facilitate visual inter-
pretation), shows that the blue collar group gained up to 
the mid ’80s compared to the other two groups, which 
reduced inequality across occupations. After 1985 we 
see an increase in inequality across groups, which had 
been more pronounced in the late ’80s but continued into 
the ’90s. Once again, the gain of professional women 
on blue collar women has been very similar to the gain 
of college graduate women on high school graduate 
women from 1981 to 2001 (26 percent compared to 27 
percent). This points toward the idea that occupation is 
as good a measure of skills as education, a conclusion 
that is supported by the ﬁndings on the regression co-
efﬁcients reported below. 
The message of Figures 10–12 is clear. While the 
wage premium of professional workers relative to blue 
collar workers grew during the last two decades at a rate 
similar to the wage premium of college graduates over 
high school graduates, the ratio of professional work-
ers to blue collar workers has not changed for men but 
has changed noticeably for women. There has been a 
large change in the educational composition of workers 
within each occupation, however. This may be due to the 
change in the way labor markets allocate workers to dif-
ferent positions, but it is not clear that it is the result of 
the higher ratio of skilled workers required in machine 
operation (as assumed in Krusell et al. 2000).
In terms of the closing of the female/male wage 
gap, it is worthwhile to point out that while blue collar 
women have closed 31 percent of the wage gap with re-
spect to their male counterparts, professional and white 
collar women closed only 15 percent and 5 percent of 
their wage gap, respectively. Inequality within the oc-
cupation groups started increasing for men in the mid 
’80s, with similar increases for all groups. For women, 
inequality within each group started to grow earlier: in 
the mid ’70s for the professional group (within which 
inequality grew the most), in the late ’70s for the blue 
collar group, and in the early ’80s for the white collar 
group. Again, the trend of mean and median wages by 
occupation is similar to the trend by education both in 
pattern and in magnitude.
Regressions: Education, 
Occupation, or Unobservables?
The linear Mincerian log wage speciﬁcation is among 
the most frequently estimated stable regressions that 
economists have been using over the last 40 years. It is 
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represent human capital and labor market segmentation 
indicators.20 The most common human capital indica-
tors are schooling (by years or level) and experience 
(normally measured as potential experience  =  age  − 
6  − years of schooling). We add to these occupation 
indicators as an additional measure of human capital. 
Labor market segmentation indicators included are race 
and region. We use dummy variables for schooling rela-
tive to high school graduates, the largest and most stable 
schooling group over the whole period, and we also use 
dummy variables for occupations relative to blue collar 
workers.
We estimate this version of the log wage regression 
by OLS separately for men and women using the cross 
section of each year separately. We include a linear and 
a quadratic term in experience to allow for nonlinear 
effects. The estimated vector of coefﬁcients is the yearly 
conditional means, and we report the trends in these 
coefﬁcients for the relevant right-side variables. Speciﬁ-
cally, let Wit be the weekly earnings of individual i in 
year t, and let Xit be the corresponding vector of human 
capital and labor market segmentation variables. Then 
the Mincerian equation is Wit  − ′ = �t it X  Uit , where  �t 
is a vector of estimated coefﬁcients (often using OLS) 
for year t, and Uit is the log wage residual that stands 
for unobserved components such as unobserved human 
capital (ability/ambition), ﬁrm productivity differences, 
and labor market (search) frictions and for measurement 
and estimation errors.
Figures 13 and 14 present the OLS estimated co-
efﬁcients for the schooling dummies (where HSG is the 
default group) with and without the occupation dummies 
for men and women. When not including occupation 
dummies, between 1963 and 1981 there has not been 
considerable change in the coefﬁcients on HSD women 
and on SC and CG for either gender. (If anything, the 
coefﬁcient on CG women declined somewhat.) The 
coefﬁcient on PG men increased and that on HSD men 
declined slightly. In 1982 a secular growth began in the 
coefﬁcient on the dummies for college graduates and 
postgraduates, representing the return to these educa-
tion levels, which grew from 33 percent and 50 percent 
in 1981 to 59 percent and 85 percent by 2002 for men, 
and similarly from 33 percent and 55 percent in 1981 
to 56 percent and 82 percent in 2002 for women. The 
difference in the coefﬁcients on college graduate and 
postgraduate education for both genders at all years 
is striking and emphasizes the importance of treating 
them as separate skill groups. The increase in the SC 
coefﬁcients and the decline in the HSD coefﬁcients that 
start in 1981 are also nonnegligible, though not as stark 
as the change in the CG/PG coefﬁcients. It should be 
noted that the timing and the level of the change in trends 
of the coefﬁcients are consistent with the unconditional 
means of earnings by sex and education reported in Fig-
ures 6 and 7. Moreover, it is worth noting that the level 
of the coefﬁcients for men and women is very similar 
for all years and all schooling groups, except that the 
return to college and especially postgraduate education 
was higher for women during the ’60s and ’70s.
Once occupational dummies are included in the re-
gression, the coefﬁcients on the educational dummies all 
decline, indicating that some of the gains to education 
are through a worker’s ability to secure an occupation 
with higher earnings. For the male SC, CG, and PG 
groups, occupational dummies capture on average 29 
percent, 31 percent, and 28 percent of the return to these 
education levels, respectively. This is striking, given 
the very coarse nature of our occupational classiﬁca-
tion using only three groups, and underscores the fact 
that occupation should be routinely included in studies 
of labor market returns. For women, the occupational 
dummies capture less of the return to the SC, CG, and 
PG education levels (24 percent, 18 percent, and 15 
percent, respectively), but more of the return to a high 
school education (34 percent).
Figure 15 shows the increase in earnings for an ad-
ditional year of potential experience over time for both 
men and women (evaluated for labor market entrants for 
whom the quadratic term is negligible). We see that the 
return to potential experience for men was substantially 
higher than for women and that it increased somewhat 
between 1963 and 1976, but did not change much from 
1976 to 1994. For women the return to experience in-
creased from 1964 until 1994, which coincides with the 
period during which their participation rate increased 
(and therefore during which time their actual experience 
grew as a share of potential experience). Since 1994 
the return to experience declined for both genders. The 
inclusion of the occupational dummies does not have 
a noticeable impact on the coefﬁcients on experience, 
which implies that the return to experience does not 
come through moving into occupations with higher 
earnings over a worker’s career. 
  20See Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2003 for a recent survey of the Mincerian 
equation and Griliches 1977 and Willis 1986 for classic discussions of the theory 
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Two important facts arise from Figure 16, which 
plots the coefﬁcient on the occupational dummies for 
men and women. First, the occupational dummies for 
professionals have increased for both men and women 
since the late ’70s in a way similar to the increase in 
the coefﬁcients for education. This implies that occupa-
tions are related to the increase in inequality as much as 
education is, but the causation between the three is far 
from being clear. The other important feature of these 
coefﬁcients is that they are much higher for women, both 
in professional and in white collar occupations. The fact 
that the inclusion of occupational dummies reduces the 
coefﬁcients on education less for women implies that 
there is a weaker correlation between occupation and 
education among women than among men (as we have 
already seen when looking at the occupational distribu-
tion within education groups for women). Moreover, the 
higher estimates of the coefﬁcients on the occupational 
dummies imply that occupation is a more important indi-
cator for women than for men. Not surprisingly then, we 
also ﬁnd that the inclusion of the occupational dummies 
increases explanatory power more for women than for 
men. The R2 with the inclusion of the occupation dum-
mies is 21 percent higher than without their inclusion for 
women and 13 percent higher for men. Once again, it is 
surprising that such a coarse occupational classiﬁcation 
can increase explanatory power substantially.
The magnitude of the return to professional occupa-
tions is substantial; as noted above, it is comparable 
in its order of magnitude and time trend to the return 
to a college education (relative to HSG). In fact, the   
predicted wage of a male high school graduate profes-
sional is only 13 percent below the predicted wage of a 
college graduate white collar worker, while the predicted 
wage of a male some-college professional worker is 4 
percent above the predicted wage of a college graduate 
white collar worker. In terms of time trends, the largest 
change took place in the return to a professional occupa-
tion. This return for men decreased in the ’70s from 29 
percent in 1970 to 21 percent in 1978, then increased 
fairly steadily to 41 percent by 2001. At the same time, 
the return to a college education—once controlling for 
occupation—was roughly constant in the ’70s, then in-
creased from 21 percent in 1979 to 40 percent by 2001. 
As for the return to a white collar occupation, it declined 
from 6 percent in 1970 to below zero by the end of the 
’70s, then increased again to reach 9 percent by 2001. 
For women, the return to a professional occupation de-
clined somewhat during the ’70s from 36 percent in 1970 
to 32 percent in 1978. Then it increased to 44 percent by 
2001, while the return to a college education declined 
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(The average increase was 0.77 percentage points be-
tween 1962 and 1973, 1.36 percentage points between 
1973 and 1979, and 0.73 percentage points between 
1979 and 1997). Female labor force participation has 
remained stable since 1997. These dramatic and differ-
ent trends correspond well to the dramatic differences 
in the trend of mean wages of men and women (Figure 
2). Together Figures 2 and 18 imply lower inequality 
in labor market earnings regardless of gender within a 
hypothetical representative household.22 
The decreasing trend of the male participation rate and 
the increasing trend of the female rate are observed at all 
schooling levels (Figures 19 and 20), at least until 1994, 
though to a different extent. In particular, postgraduate, 
college graduate, and some-college male participation 
rates decreased much less (4 to 6 percentage points over 
the whole sample) than those of high school graduate 
increased to 45 percent by 2001. The return to a white 
collar occupation for women declined from 25 percent 
in 1970 to 14 percent in 1982 after which it rebounded 
somewhat to reach 19 percent by 2001.
Finally, Figure 17 shows that after we condition on 
all the observables, the standard deviation of the residual 
error estimated by the OLS has a shape and timing of 
change similar to that of the standard deviation of the un-
conditional log wage distribution (Figure 3). It is worth 
noting that including occupational dummies decreases 
the standard deviation of the residuals only slightly (by 
about 2.5 percent).
The trends in the estimated coefﬁcients of the wage 
regressions with and without occupational dummies pro-
vide similar results to the analysis of the unconditional 
means based on Figures 1–12. The main message is that 
(1) there has been a large and coincidental increase   
in the earnings of highly educated workers and of work-
ers in highly ranked occupations, and this increase took 
place at the same time as the increase in inequality, 
which implies that these could be related phenomena; 
(2) the unobserved component of earnings function that 
was estimated as orthogonal to the included variables 
shows a trend in standard error that matches the pattern 
of the growth in unconditional earnings inequality.
Labor Supply: A Gender Hypothesis?
Labor force participation measures labor supply as a per-
centage of the population. Having documented the trends 
in wages by gender, education, and occupation, we now 
turn to the corresponding labor force participation rates 
to document the changes that took place on the supply 
side during the period of increased inequality. Figure 18 
shows the evolution of the labor force participation and 
of the unemployment rate from 1962 to 2003.21 Since 
the unemployment rate in the United States does not 
show a secular trend during this period, the trend of the 
labor force participation rate closely corresponds to the 
trend of the employment rate without being inﬂuenced 
as much by business cycle variations. The participation 
rate also has a very similar trend to the average number 
of weeks worked by men and women over this period; 
hence, it measures well the amount of labor supplied by 
the two genders. The male participation rate declined 
from 94 percent in 1962 to 89 percent in 1976 and has 
declined more gradually since then, reaching 86 percent 
by 2003. The female labor force participation rate in-
creased steadily from 42 percent in 1962 to 72 percent 
in 1997, with the fastest growth taking place in the ’70s. 
  21The labor force participation rate is deﬁned as the total number of age 22–65 
people working or looking for work divided by the population of that age group.
  22It should be noted that the household earnings distribution also showed an 
increase in inequality. See Katz and Autor 1999. This fact could be explained by 
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and high school dropout men (13 and 15 percentage 
points over the whole sample, respectively). High school 
dropout male participation plummeted from 91 percent 
in 1964 to 71 percent in 1994, with a bounce back after 
1994 to 76 percent by 2003. For women, the increase in 
the participation rate showed up most markedly among 
high school graduate, some-college, and college gradu-
ate women. Postgraduate women experienced only a 
small increase in their participation rate, as they started 
at a much higher level in the ’60s (almost 20 percentage 
points above college graduate women), while the high 
school dropout women’s participation rate started low 
at 39 percent in 1962 and increased only moderately to 
49 percent by 2003. It should be noted that since the mid 
’90s participation rates of men and women, both overall 
and conditional on education, show relative stability, 
which coincides with the stabilization of the female/male 
wage gap. At the same time, despite the stabilization of 
participation rates, both overall and between education 
group inequality continued to grow.
The unemployment rate relates to the difference be-
tween the participation rate and the employment rate. 
It shows a clear ranking by schooling, for both men and 
women, such that high school dropout unemployment 
is the highest and postgraduate unemployment is the 
lowest from 1962 to 2003. The male unemployment rate 
exceeds the female rate at all schooling levels except 
for the postgraduate group, with the difference being 
larger at lower educational levels. Moreover, male and 
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the same cyclical movement as the aggregate. These 
facts imply that the ﬂuctuations in the labor market for 
men and women of the same education are highly cor-
related even though the trends in the participation rate 
are very different, which leads one to conclude that men 
and women of the same education compete in the same 
labor market.
White and nonwhite men follow similar trends 
with nonwhite men having a consistently lower rate of 
participation and a higher rate of unemployment. Non-
white women workers start out with a markedly higher 
participation rate (53 percent compared to 41 percent). 
The two participation rates converge by the late ’80s and 
follow a similar trend since then. At the same time, the 
unemployment rate of nonwhite women is higher than 
that of white women in all years.
Figures 18–20 show that during the past 40 years the 
diversity of the labor force grew in terms of gender and 
schooling. These dramatic changes are potentially as 
important in explaining the trends in wages as the tech-
nological changes of the last 25 years. In other words, 
it is possible that forces other than technological shifts 
directly affected the labor supply of women, and these 
forces could be equally important in understanding the 
trend in wage growth and inequality. The empirical and 
theoretical economic literature on wage inequality has 
not given sufﬁcient attention to such alternatives, as it 
has most often treated supply changes as responses to 
exogenous changes in technology.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we provided a summary of facts on the 
evolution of the U.S. labor market from 1961 to 2002. 
These facts give rise to some doubt about the dominant 
role of the popular hypothesis that during the last two 
decades the United States experienced a skill-biased tech-
nical change. First, there has been no marked change in 
recent decades in the occupational distribution, except 
for the increase in the share of professional women, 
who did not experience a spectacular rise in the returns 
to their skills (unlike, for example, postgraduate men). 
Despite the stability of the occupational distribution, the 
wage gap between occupations rose at the same time that 
inequality increased and at about the same rate as the 
wage gap by education. Therefore, we believe that any 
theory addressing the changes in the wage and employ-
ment structure should also incorporate occupation as a 
measure of skill.
Second, the most dramatic changes in the labor 
market during the past four decades took place among 
women. The change in their labor supply cannot be 
ignored when trying to understand the changes in the 
wage structure of men, since the facts clearly indicate 
that it is wrong to assume that women and men partici-
pate in separate labor markets. Therefore, we argue that 
a theory that attempts to provide an explanation for the 
main changes in the wage and employment structure 
over the last 40 years should incorporate an explanation 
for the dramatic change in women’s performance in a 
labor market. 
Alternative leading hypotheses to explain the rising 
wage inequality include the decline of unions and the 
decline in the real minimum wage, or, more generally, 
changes in institutions. These explanations focus mainly 
on the reduction in earnings of the less educated during 
the ’80s and early ’90s. The role of globalization and 
the increase in trade and out-sourcing emphasizes the 
decline in the return to less-skilled workers in the United 
States. It seems that it is possible that these factors were 
important between 1979 and 1993, when wages of the 
less-skilled went down. But the spectacular rise in wages 
of postgraduate workers that started in the mid-’60s, 
continued throughout the four decades, and increased in 
the second half of the ’90s cannot be explained by these 
alternative hypotheses. In fact, the continuous rise of 
postgraduate wages also raises some questions regard-
ing the SBTC hypothesis as it is used in the literature 
described by Aghion (2002).23 
It is, of course, more likely that there are several fac-
tors that account for the main changes that have occurred 
in the labor market during the last four decades. To un-
derstand the importance of the various mechanisms, it is 
necessary to formulate dynamic models that can quanti-
tatively include the main alternative explanations so that 
one can measure the impact of each one of them. Such 
models are needed since they enable us to understand 
the observed trends in labor markets and they provide 
guidance regarding the evolution of the economy and 
the potential for policy intervention to improve welfare. 
To attain these goals, it is crucial to measure the impact 
of the alternative explanations regarding the facts on the 
evolution of the labor market that have been reviewed 
in this article.
  23The continued rise in the postgraduate wage premium is inconsistent with 
the view that the economy discretely moved from one stochastic steady state, prior 
to 1980, to another stochastic steady state, since the mid ’90s.Evolution of Earnings Inequality
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Appendix A: Data
We use data from the 1962–2003 March CPS Annual Demo-
graphic Survey ﬁles provided by Unicon. In choosing our 
sample restrictions, we have two goals in mind: to maintain 
comparability between our work and earlier studies and to 
give an accurate description of the data. We deviate from the 
conventions used in earlier studies only in cases where we 
believe there is a well-justiﬁed reason to do so.
We restrict the sample to civilian adults between the ages 
of 22 and 65. When constructing the employment and weeks 
worked samples, we make no further restrictions. In our wage 
and occupation sample, we further restrict our attention to full-
time full-year workers, where a worker is considered full-time 
if he or she works at least 35 hours a week and full-year if 
he or she works at least 40 weeks a year. For these workers, 
we construct the wage sample by taking the annual wage and 
salary earnings, dividing it by the number of weeks worked, 
and annualizing the resulting weekly wage by multiplying it 
by 52. Nominal wages are then deﬂated using the personal 
consumption expenditure deﬂator from the NIPA to express 
all real wages in constant 2002 dollars.
For both the occupation and the wage sample, we exclude 
observations where the worker is working without pay or is 
self-employed. The exclusion of the self-employed is an un-
fortunate necessity. While it would be desirable to have them 
included in our wage sample, the wage information reported 
on them is of very poor quality, especially before 1988 when 
almost half of the self-employed report wages below half 
the minimum wage. This ratio abruptly drops to less than 10 
percent in 1988, indicating that the change in March 1989 in 
the way earnings data were collected had a signiﬁcant impact 
on the reliability of earnings data for the self-employed. As 
the self-employed have a larger variance of wages than those 
who are not self-employed (at least past 1988) and there is a 
larger fraction of them in the beginning of our sample, there 
is reason to believe that the exclusion of the self-employed 
reduces any measure of inequality more in the ’60s than later 
on, which gives further indirect evidence of a U-shape in 
inequality that appears to some extent in the data.
With regard to the wage sample, we need to make two 
additional choices: how to treat topcoded observations and 
how to treat very low reported wages. In terms of the top-
coding, there are two periods that are informative since we 
know something about very high earnings in these periods. 
Between 1961 and 1966 the real value of the topcode is very 
high, close to half a million dollars (in 2002 dollars); hence, 
no observations are topcoded in practice. If in this period a 
similar topcode was imposed (in real terms), as was in place 
in the ’70s and ’80s, then the thus topcoded observations 
would average 1.5 times the topcode. The second period is 
past 1995, since starting with the 1996 March CPS, topcoded 
observations take on the value of the average of all topcoded 
observations instead of the topcode value as before. In this 
second period topcoded observations average two times the 
topcode. Given these two observations we assign topcoded 
observations prior to 1995 a value of the topcode multiplied 
by 1.75. (This value also works well in avoiding any jump in 
mean wages when the topcoding method changes.) 
The treatment of the very low wages is more contentious. 
Clearly, some lower bound needs to be established in order 
to eliminate implausibly small wage observations (such as 
a couple hundred dollars per year for a full-time full-year 
worker in 2002 dollars). Previous authors have taken the ap-
proach of dropping observations that would imply an hourly 
wage that is less than half the minimum wage. This would 
imply imposing a lower limit of around $4,200 per year in 
our sample. Observations below this limit are most common 
among women in the ’60s. Examining these very low obser-
vations, we conclude that in fact it is very plausible that they 
are valid observations of very low wages as opposed to being 
the result of measurement error, as previous authors contend. 
Most such low wage observations are for high school dropout 
women whose occupation is classiﬁed as private household 
worker or farm worker. In fact, in the early to mid ’60s close 
to 50 percent of observations among women making between 
one-sixth and one-half of the minimum wage are of these two 
occupations (mostly private household), while only 4 percent 
of all female observations are of these occupations. (This latter 
fraction quickly drops to below 1 percent by the late ’70s.) 
Minimum wage laws did not apply to these occupations in 
the ’60s; hence, it is very plausible that these workers earned 
much less than the ofﬁcial minimum wage. With the decline 
in the share of women who worked in the private household 
sector, the fraction of these very low wage observations has 
dropped considerably. In sum, instead of using the more com-
mon half-of-minimum-wage benchmark, we use one-sixth of 
the minimum wage as the lower limit below which we drop 
wage observations. Note that the conclusions regarding the 
evolution of female inequality are very sensitive to how one 
treats these very low observations of weekly wages. If these 
low observations were dropped from the sample, then there 
would be no fall in female inequality in the ’60s.
Once the samples are constructed, we divide them by 
gender and into ﬁve education groups: high school dropouts 
(HSD), high school graduates (HSG), workers with some col-
lege (SC), college graduates (CG), and postgraduate degree 
holders (PG). Past 1992, when we have information on an 
individual’s highest degree received, the construction of the 
education variable is straightforward. Prior to 1991, however, 
we only have information on the number of grades attended 
and completed. In order to determine the best educational clas-
siﬁcation of our ﬁve groups, we match observations between FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
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1991 and 1992 to see what the same individual reported as 
educational attainment under the two classiﬁcation systems. 
(Due to the design of the CPS, half of the March sample 
overlaps from one year to the next.) Based on this it is clear 
that the best correspondence is to classify those who have 
completed less than 12 years of schooling as HSD (with an 
89 percent overlap), those who completed exactly 12 years 
of schooling as HSG (with an 87 percent overlap), those who 
started 13th grade but did not complete 16 years of schooling 
as SC (with an 84 percent overlap), those who completed 16 
years of schooling but only started their 17th year as CG (with 
an 83 percent overlap), and those who completed 18 years of 
schooling as PG (with an 83 percent overlap). The only dif-
ﬁcult decision was how to consider those who completed 17 
years of schooling but not 18, as 48.5 percent of these report 
having a college degree while 45.2 percent of them report 
having a postgraduate degree. We decided to classify these as 
college graduates since this gave the smallest break in the com-
position graphs at the time of the classiﬁcation change. Also 
note that compared to the size of college graduates and those 
who are deﬁnitely postgraduate degree holders (those with 18 
years of education or more), the group of those with 17 years 
of education is small (less than 20 percent of college grads and 
less than 30 percent of postgraduate degree holders).
To gauge the effect of using ﬁve education groups as op-
posed to the more standard four groups, in ﬁgures available 
online we compare the trends in wages by education groups 
with ﬁve compared to four groups. We see that once PG work-
ers are included among the college graduates when using four 
groups, the trends in CG earnings change both in their level 
and in their timing. It is also clear that the differences between 
the PG and CG groups are at least as large as those between the 
CG and SC groups, and comparable in size to the difference 
between the CG and HSG groups, which very much justiﬁes 
treating the PG group separately. 
Appendix B: Occupations
In this appendix we provide a detailed description of the way 
we constructed the three occupational levels. This is important 
since the deﬁnitions of occupations have changed signiﬁcantly 
during the sample period.
Prior to the 1971 March CPS, the 1960 Census of Popula-
tion Occupational Classiﬁcation System was used, which was 
sufﬁciently different from later years to exclude these years 
from our study of occupations. Starting with the 1971 March 
CPS, the 1970 Census classiﬁcation was used. Starting with 
the 1983 March CPS, the 1980 Census classiﬁcation was used. 
And starting with the 1992 March CPS, the 1990 Census clas-
siﬁcation was used, which was very similar to the 1980 clas-
siﬁcation system. Starting with the 2003 March CPS, the North 
American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) based on 
the Census 2000 industry and occupation codes was used. 
We did not recode this system to be consistent with previous 
years of data, since this would have given us only one more 
year of observations.
We constructed the following three categories by consis-
tently aggregating the various classiﬁcation systems:
Professional and managerial occupations: Executive, 
administrative, and managerial occupations; sales supervisors; 
engineers and architects; mathematical, natural, and computer 
scientists; computer programmers; social scientists; physi-
cians, dentists, and related practitioners; postsecondary teach-
ers; lawyers and judges; writers, artists, and entertainers.
White collar occupations: Registered nurses, pharmacists, 
dietitians, therapists, and physicians’ assistants; kindergarten, 
elementary, and secondary teachers; counselors; librarians, ar-
chivists, and curators; social, recreation, and religious workers; 
technologists and technicians; sales representatives, workers, 
and related occupations; administrative support occupations; 
records processing occupations; computer equipment opera-
tors; information clerks; material recording, scheduling, and 
distributing clerks; adjusters and investigators.
Blue collar occupations: Service occupations; billing, 
posting, and calculating machine operators; farming, forestry, 
and ﬁshing occupations; precision production, craft, and repair 
occupations; operators, fabricators, and laborers. 
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